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SOLUTION OF
"THE EVIL THAT MEN DO"
WILLIAM F. CAHILL, B.A., L.L.B., J.C.D.*
Moral Question 1: Should Green, as Black's representative, pay the
$4,000 debt to Molly Mauve without having that debt established on
a trial?
U NDER THE FACTS STATED, Green's moral right to deal with Black's
property will be premised upon the powers given by the law of
New Island to administrators of decedents' estates. He will be morally
obliged to exercise his powers, not only in accordance with the general
principles of morality, but also in accordance with the standards of con-
duct which the law of the State imposes upon the personal representa-
tives of deceased persons. We can here ignore the moral rights and
duties which would have to be considered if it appeared that Green had
other powers to deal with Black's property, arising out of a gift made
to Green, inter vivos mortis causa, or by will, under a promise to use
the subject property for certain purposes.
We will assume that the law of New Island, in its provisions which
touch this case, follows the pattern most common in the American
States. Under that law, Green will become the personal representative
of Black only when the court has. issued letters authorizing him to admin-
ister Black's estate, as executor or otherwise. From the money which
Black left or which is realized by lawful sale of Black's property during
administration of the estate, the personal representative will pay the
debts of the decedent. In some jurisdictions, each such payment is made
upon authorization of the probate court. In such a jurisdiction, Green
would have responsibility only to make recommendation to the court,
and would not have full moral responsibility for deciding upon the
payment of any claim. We may take it that New Island is one of the
jurisdictions in which the representative has a direct responsibility for
paying or allowing claims. Once he has received letters, Green will be
authorized and obliged to pay or to allow claims justly due at law, and
his payment or allowance will have legal effect without the court's
*Priest of the Diocese of Albany. Acting Dean and Professor of Law, St. John's
University School of Law. Editor of THE CATHOLiC LAWYER.
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approval. Since the administrator, when he
pays or allows a claim of debt against an
estate is acting as an officer of the court
and is exercising, over property which is
not his own, a power given him by the law,
he is morally bound to exercise this power
in accordance with the standard the law has
established for his conduct. The generally
accepted legal standard for the performance
of this duty is that the representative shall
pay a claim when there is objectively satis-
factory proof that the claim is justly due
at law.
The statement says Green is certain that
Black died owing Molly $4,000. Green
should not pay the sum to Molly upon the
basis only of his subjective certainty that
it is justly due to her. With the assistance
of his attorney, he should consider (1)
whether the claim is justly due at law and
(2) whether there is objectively satisfac-
tory proof of that conclusion. Nothing re-
cited in the statement casts an obvious
doubt upon the truth of the conclusion,
but Green should have Joiner's help in
examining the evidence in detail and with
reference to the rules of law which -may
have application here. Applying the rules,
they should determine whether the debt
was contracted and is still legally due, and
whether the representative is legally
authorized to pay it.
If the claimant's statement alone sup-
ported her claim of debt, the executor
would act imprudently in paying or allow-
ing her claim. While corroboration is not
required as a matter of law, even when the
claim is made against the estate of a
deceased person, the evidence, viewed as
a whole and in the circumstances of the
case, must be clear and convincing.' How-
I McKeon v. Van Slyck, 223 N.Y. 392, 119 N.E.
851 (1918).
ever clear Molly Mauve's statement on the
debt transaction may be, the circumstance
that she lived with the decedent without
benefit of a marriage ceremony and the
circumstance that she did not urge her
claim at law after he left her, suggest that
the executor should be cautious in giving
credence to her statement. Further, one
cannot say that the executor is morally
obliged to pay a claim supported only by
the uncorroborated parol of an interested
witness. To do so would make him liable
to surcharge upon his accounting, 2 and he
surely has no moral obligation to pay
Black's debts out of his own pocket.
It appears here that her claim is sup-
ported, to some extent at least, by the evi-
dence of the Browns' statements and of the
decedent's records. Prudence and diligence
require that the executor take Molly's
sworn statement of the debt transaction
and its circumstances, and consider that
statement with the other evidence. The
inferences of liability arising from that
other evidence may be impaired or de-
stroyed by the claimant's testimony. In
New York, and probably in other jurisdic-
tions where the personal representative
has primary responsibility for deciding
whether a claim shall be paid, even an
examination before trial will not effect a
waiver of the executor's right to invoke
the Dead Man's Statute at a trial follow-
ing upon his rejection of the claim.3
Consideration of her statement, with
the other evidence, may carry Green's
2 In the Matter of Estate of Hanrette, 140 Misc.
832, 252 N.Y. Supp. 424 (Surr. Ct. 1931). See
Matter of Account of Mulligan, 82 Misc. 336, 143
N.Y. Supp. 686 (Surr. Ct. 1913).
3 In the Matter of Accounting of VanVolkenburg,
254 N.Y. 139, 172 N.E. 269 (1930); In re Gray's
Estate, 165 N.Y.S.2d 602 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
mind to a clear conviction that her claim
is justly due at law. Paying or allowing
her claim upon that conviction, he could
not be said to have defrauded the estate.
Yet he would act imprudently if by paying
the claim he left himself open to being
found negligent and therefore liable to
surcharge upon his accounting. The execu-
tor and his attorney must apply here the
standard employed by the courts in assess-
ing such negligence and imposing a conse-
quent liability. If a court will be satisfied
that the claimant's statement is credible,
in view of her character and the circum-
stances of the case, and especially that her
statement is corroborated by other evi-
dence, it will not surcharge the paying
executor.4 Nor need the executor fear
that the statute will operate to deprive him
of the benefit of the claimant's testimony
in the proceeding upon his accounting, for
the statute has been held consistently to
be inapplicable in any case where the
testimony of a paid creditor of the de-
ceased is proposed to be adduced in evi-
dence in such a proceeding. 5 The claimant
will not be a party to that proceeding, and
no title or interest is derived by the execu-
tor from her. 6
Where the executor believes the claim
justly due at law and yet has reasonable
fear that the court may find the evidence
supporting it insufficiently clear and con-
vincing, he may allow the claim, without
paying it in advance of his accounting.
Thus the claimant will be spared the
4 In the Matter of Accounting of Klausner, 192
Misc. 790, 77 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
Id. at 794, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
,In the Matter of Accounting of Frazer, 92 N.Y.
239,247 (1883);In the Matter of Account of Lese,
176 App. Div. 744, 163 N.Y. Supp. 1014 (1st
Dep't 1917).
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trouble and expense of bringing a separate
suit to determine her claim, and the claim-
ant will have in the accounting proceed-
ing the benefit of the presumption of valid-
ity attributed to allowed claims by the pro-
bate statutes.7 Yet, if the claim is there
successfully contested, and therefore re-
jected by the court, the executor cannot be
subjected to a surcharge because he will
not have paid the claim.
Nevertheless, an executor who, without
any reasonable fear that the claim is just
and supported by proof which will satisfy
the court, rejects a claim or allows it with-
out payment, violates his duty to the court
and commits an act of injustice to the
estate and to the creditor. He is made an
officer of the court and is paid his fees
in order that he shall assume responsi-
bility to investigate the facts and to judge
the justice and validity of claims. He can-
not honestly hold the office and its emolu-
ments while shifting his responsibility back
to the court that appointed him or to an-
other court which will be called upon to
determine the debt. Nor do the adminis-
trator and his attorney act justly when
they, without good reason, cast upon the
estate and upon the creditor the burden
of delay and the additional fees and costs
and trouble involved in needless trials.
After the above'was written, Professor
Paul Powers called to my attention the
following remarks of the late Surrogate
Heaton which appear to summarize and
support the reasoning of the present
answer:
Every representative of an estate, soon
after he enters upon the discharge of his du-
ties, must determine whether claims made
against the deceased are honest and valid
7 See N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT §210.
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claims, and whether debts apparently due
the deceased are actually due and the true
and correct amount thereof. To do this he
must make careful investigation in each
case, and necessarily a large part of the in-
formation he is able to get must come from
the creditor or debtor himself. If, after mak-
ing such honest inquiry, he is satisfied that
a certain debt is due from the deceased, he
should pay it; or, if the deceased had a valid
claim against a person, he should collect the
amount due and release the debtor. He
should not in ordinary cases take the posi-
tion that the true facts will be difficult or
impossible of proof under section 829 of the
Code of Civil Procedure [now section 347
of the New York Civil Practice Act] and put
either of such parties to his legal proof.
It is the duty of the representative to set-
tle the affairs of the estate; and he may settle
or compromise claims for or against the
estate, and a settlement made by him can be
be set aside only upon proof of bad faith
or fraud.8
Unless some reasonable fear remains
after Green and Joiner have investigated
Molly Mauve's claim of debt, her claim
should be paid without being brought to
trial.
Moral Question 2: Should Green, through
Joiner, object to the admission of Molly
Mauve's testimony on the debt at a trial
which will determine that the debt is
owing?
If Green- refuses to allow the claim and
Molly Mauve sues upon it, Green, as the
personal representative of Black, will
have power to invoke the Dead Man's
Statute. At the trial of her claim, he can
object to the admission of her testimony
regarding transactions between her and
the decedent related to her claim, and he
can move the court to strike any such
8 In the Matter of Estate of Herrington, 73 Misc.
182, 185, 132 N.Y. Supp. 486, 487 (Surr. Ct.
1911).
testimony received after he so objected.
Our moral question comes to this: Will
Green, in that event, be morally obliged or
permitted to exercise the power given him
by the statute?
Our answer must distinguish between
three basically different situations. (1)
Green may know or reasonably fear that
claimant's excludable testimony will move
the trial court to allow an unjust or invalid
claim. He may have no such fear, because
either (2) he is advised by counsel that,
though she will offer a mendacious or
mistaken statement of the facts, her state-
ments will be ineffective as against rules
of law, presumptions, cross examination,
or other evidence that favors the position
of the executor, or because (3) he has
no doubt of the justice and validity of the
claim or of the veracity of her testimony.
In the first situation, it can be reason-
ably argued that the state, in enacting the
statute, put upon personal representatives
a duty to save their estates from unjust or
invalid claims by invoking the statute. This
intent, at least, seems implicit in the only
purposes clearly assigned to the statute
by legislative committees urging its adop-
tion or continuation and by judges con-
struing it. In this situation, if anywhere,
the purposes ascribed to the statute seem
to demand that the estate representative
shall not waive his objection."
The criticisms levelled at the statute by
Professor Wigmore' ° and others are
9 "If death has closed the lips of the one party,
the policy of the law is to close the lips of the
other." Louis v. Easton, 50 Ala. 470, 471 (1874).
"The temptation to falsehood and concealment in
such cases is considered too great, to allow the
surviving party to testify in his own behalf."
Owens v. Owens, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878).
102 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §578 (3d ed. 1940),
(Supp. 1959).
strongly persuasive that the expediency of
the statute is extremely doubtful, but they
seem not to justify categorizing the statute
as intolerably unjust and irrational. If they
did, the statute would be ineffective to
create directly any moral obligation. A hu-
man law can create a moral obligation
only when it meets the tests for a just law.
A statute which excludes evidence from
the consideration of a court is not per se
contrary to higher law, nor is its enactment
beyond the competence of the lawmaker.
But if the statute's effect is clearly op-
posed to the common good of the society
in which it is enacted, or clearly and in-
herently inequitable in its operation, it is
no law. Yet, even if the Dead Man's Stat-
ute were thus ineffective to impose directly
moral obligations, the statute would have
some indirect effect upon the moral prob-
lem of the executor. If his defiance of the
law would give serious scandal, he would
have to exercise his legal power to exclude
the claimant's testimony.
Whether or not the statute be morally
ineffective, an executor is surely not
obliged to incur a surcharge by waiving
his objection. If the claim were shown to
be invalid, and to have been known to
the executor to have been invalid, his
failure to object at the trial to testimony
obnoxious to the statute would justify a
finding of negligence or collusion.
The situation we have labelled (2)
seems not to have application in the present
case, though it might be developed in the
inquisitorial investigation by Green and
Joiner. They might find that Molly is lying
or mistaken in her report of the circum-
stances which she asserts gave rise to the
debt, and they might find that the dece-
dent's records and other independent
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proof, such as the Browns' statements, af-
ford them ample material with which to
controvert successfully her claim. If they
then judge that their task can be ac-
complished more expeditiously or more
surely by letting in her testimony and con-
troverting it, than by excluding it, they
will be morally permitted to choose the
better expedient If that expedient afforded
the estate a certain and notable advantage,
they would be obliged to employ it. Here
again, they must consider the likelihood of
a surcharge, though that seems less prob-
able in this situation.
In the present case, the situation at a
trial of Molly Mauve's claim is likely to be
that which we have numbered (3). Green's
refusal to allow the claim without adjudica-
tion would be premised upon no affirma-
tive doubt that the debt is due and honestly
provable, but upon a negative though rea-
soned hesitation to charge upon his estate
a claim not satisfactorily provable as justly
due at law. We may suppose that he thus
hesitates to breach his moral duty to ad-
minister carefully, and to risk a surcharge,
because his consideration of the evidence
of the decedent's records and the state-
ments of Molly Mauve and the Browns
leaves him not satisfied that the existence
of the debt is clearly and convincingly
proved. He is going to trial in order that
the court, with the advantages of a con-
tentious examination of the claim, may
have opportunity to evaluate and relate the
various items of evidence. He has no af-
firmative doubt that Molly's testimony will
be mistaken or mendacious in its recital of
the facts, but he belives that her claim
cannot be allowed by a court which does
not hear and consider her testimony. Does
the statute or his general obligation to ad-
minister his estate prudently oblige him to
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exclude from the court's consideration the
testimony of the claimant?
We have not been able to find any
decision which clearly fixes his duty to
invoke the statute in these circumstances.
The decision of the Supreme Court of
California in Kinley v. Largent" does not
conclude upon our problem, for the court
decided only that where the administrator
had declined to object to claimant's testi-
mony, the trial court should have considered
that evidence when determining the validity
and amount of the claim. The court took
pains to point out that any determination
of a claim in suit between the claimant and
the administrator is not conclusive as
against the heirs. Yet the decision is instruc-
tive in its recital of the conduct and motiva-
tion of the administrator and his attorney.
The lawyer told the court that he and his
client were determined not to object because
".. . we feel that to interpose a technical
objection to the competency of the plain-
tiff to testify as a witness in her own behalf
in this suit would result in an injustice. '12
He explained that the administrator had
known before his testator's death that the
plaintiff wife had advanced money to her
husband, the testator, but had not then
known the amount of the advances concern-
ing which she was to testify. The trial judge
heard her evidence and then excluded it,
holding the objection not necessary, though
he had "no doubt.., that [the plaintiff's]
claim is a just one.' 3
A distinguished New York Surrogate,
Wingate, wrote some very strongly worded
11 187 Cal. 71, 200 Pac. 937 (1921).
12 Kinley v. Largent, 187 Cal. 71, 200 Pac. 937,
938 (1921).
13 Ibid.
dicta 4 to the effect that a personal repre-
sentative must always object to testimony
obnoxious to the Dead Man's Statute. He
argued that there is no real distinction be-
tween this duty and the representative's
clear legal duty to raise the bar of the stat-
ute of limitations. The force of his remarks
is much diminished when one notes that he
was speaking in a case where he had to
disallow a personal claim of the accounting
administratrix which, her attorney argued,
was sufficiently proved by her own affi-
davit. He cited only cases where repre-
sentatives had attempted to waive the evi-
dence statute in their own favor, or where
they had allowed claims of others outlawed
by limitations.
His analogy to the duty of invoking the
statute of limitations seems to lack co-
gency when one recalls that the bar of that
statute is erected upon a presumption of
payment, and that the presumption, in its
turn, is premised upon conduct of the
claimant- he did not avail himself of the
ample periods of the statute to urge his
claim. The claimant in the other case has
not done anything or neglected to do any-
thing he could reasonably be expected to
omit or to perform, and it is not presumed
that he has had payment. The event of
death tolls the period of limitations, at
least until a representative is appointed,
though the period may have run for many
years in the debtor's lifetime. But the
same event calls the Dead Man's Statute
into operation automatically and immedi-
ately, without regard to how long before
the debtor's death the transaction had oc-
curred.
Because the owner of the outlawed debt
14 In the Matter of Estate of Van Valkenburgh,
164 Misc. 295, 298 N.Y. Supp. 819 (Surr. Ct.
1937).
has, in fact, delayed to urge his claim in
his debtor's lifetime and has, presumably,
received payment, there is no reason why
the executor's duty to reject his claim and
resist it on trial by raising the bar of the
statute should be less than absolute. But
because the survivor of a personal transac-
tion with his debtor has not, either actually
or presumably, done or omitted anything
to enhance his own position or to worsen
that of the debtor or the debtor's estate, it
seems not equitable to impose upon the
estate representative an absolute duty to
reject his claim or to resist its proof.
If that proof is credible and has corrobo-
ration, the law will hold harmless the.
executor who, before judgment, pays the
claim in reliance upon that proof.15 But
clear and ancient doctrine obliges the exe-
cutor not to pay a claim barred by limita-
tions. 16 It is submitted that these two
distinct standards, clearly established to
govern the executor's conduct in paying
claims before judgment, should be pre-
served in their distinctness, to govern also
the executor's conduct at and after a trial
of the claim.
We can find no authority in New York
for saying that, in the absence of special
facts showing fraud,, collusion or negli-
gence, an executor who waives his stat-
utory objection to a claimant's evidence
offered in the trial of a claim, will not be
allowed his costs if the claimant succeeds,
or will be surcharged if he pays the claim-
ant on the judgment secured at the trial. It
is, of course, abundantly well settled that
any executor who fails to raise the bar of
limitations at the trial of an outlawed claim
1- In the Matter of Accounting of Klausner, 192
Misc. 790, 77 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
16 Freeman v. Freeman, 2 Redf. 137 (Surr. Ct.
1874).
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will not be allowed his costs if the claim-
ant has judgment and, if he pays the judg-
ment, will be surcharged therefor.17
We conclude that, unless the law of New
Island will surcharge Green or disallow his
costs, he is not obliged, legally or morally,
to object to Molly Mauve's testimony in
the circumstances postulated in this answer
under the situation numbered (3).
Moral Question 3: What is the moral qual-
ity of the conduct of Sawyer and his
client Gertrude Gray, and that of Car-
penter and his client Molly Mauve, in
objecting to probate of Black's will?
Molly Mauve cannot participate in the
proceedings to determine the will's admis-
sion to probate without first establishing
her interest in the estate. Green's petition
shows that he does not recognize and will
contest the interest she asserts as Black's
widow, so she as an intervenor must prove
her claim of common-law marriage to the
satisfaction of the probate court before
her objection to the testator's capacity
can be heard. On the other hand, her right
to elect against the will need not be exer-
cised until after the will has been admitted.
The moral problem involved in her main-
taining an interest as Black's surviving
spouse will be discussed in our reply to
the fourth question. In discussing this
third question we will leave those problems
aside, and will assume that her interest in
the estate as widow has been settled in the
preliminary probate hearing. Gertrude
Gray's interests as a distributee and lega-
tee are recognized in the proponent's peti-
tion.
17 See 4 JESSUP-REDFIELD, LAW AND PRACTICE IN
THE SURROGATE'S COURTS IN THE STATE OF NEW
YORK §3205 (Rev. ed. 1949).
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We may say immediately that both
contestants, Gertrude Gray and Molly
Mauve, are guilty of lying and, if they veri-
fied their answers alleging fraud, duress
and the testator's incapacity, of perjury.
On the facts given, neither knew the alle-
gations made in her answer to be true, and
therefore it is as if they had offered to
the court, and perhaps verified, statements
they knew to be false. Molly claimed no
knowledge whatever of the circumstances
in which the will was executed. Gertrude
claimed to know of fraud and duress only
by inference from her uncle's generous
legacy to the Orphanage; since the infer-
ence is irrational upon its face, she had
not the knowledge her answer asserts. The
only possible extenuation of their moral
guilt of lying and perjury is that they may
not have known that the formal answers
imported knowledge, or, in Gertrude's
case, that she may not have realized her
inference was irrational. Since both attor-
neys were well aware of the state of their
clients' minds, they acted immorally in
advising and assisting in the filing and
verification of the answers. In a prosecu-
tion for perjury, the character of the an-
swers as "conclusions of law" might be a
sufficient defense. The judgment of the
moral quality of this conduct, however,
must be assessed by asking: Did the wo-
men and their lawyers believe what they
impliedly asserted when they offered these
pleadings to the court? Did they believe
that there were at least some probable
grounds for the conclusions stated? On the
facts given, we must say that they did not
so believe, and that, therefore, they were
guilty of lying and, if they verified the
pleadings, of perjury also.
Further, the contestants and their at-
torneys acted unjustly in filing objection to
probate upon grounds that they did not
know to exist, even with slight probability,
in fact. Because they well knew that their
objections could not justly prevail upon a
trial, they are guilty of unjustly harassing
the executor and the Orphanage. It is cer-
tain moral doctrine that the act of bringing
a suit to question the possession and enjoy-
ment of a right by one who is at least prob-
ably entitled thereto, is an unjust
harassment when the suitor or his attorney
knows that the suit cannot prevail.' 8
It should be noted that these conclusions
are based on the facts given. Here the ob-
jectants have no reasonable basis for any
doubt that the will was executed freely and
competently. If there were, in other cir-
cumstances, any honest reason for such a
doubt, a person truly having an interest in
the estate might honestly and justly file an
objection and pursue it for as long as that
doubt persisted. Thus, if Gertrude, who has
a statutory right to share in the estate if her
cousin made no valid will, had an honest
doubt of his competence, she could object
in the probate proceeding. The knowledge
basing her doubt might be, for example,
the fact that he had told her that he disap-
proved of orphanages in general and be-
lieved that foster home agencies should be
strengthened so they could take over most
of the work done by orphanages. Or the
basis of her doubt might be so slight as this
- she knows nothing, directly or indirectly,
of the character of the person who drew and
witnessed the will or of the circumstances
in which that was done, so that she can
have no clear reason to exclude duress
unless she has opportunity to examine or
cross examine those persons and, perhaps,
18 1 ST. ALPHONUS DE LiGUORi, THEOLOGIA
MORALIS §220, at 427 (1839).
others who know the true facts. Obviously,
an objection so based must be withdrawn
as soon as the objectant is honestly satis-
fied that there is no good reason to doubt
the validity of the will. If such reassurance
be achieved, for example, in pre-trial ex-
amination of witnesses, the objection
should be withdrawn at that point. Or it
would have to be withdrawn before any
formal proceeding if the objectant had
reasonable reassurance in conversation
with the attorney who drew the will. Cer-
tainly any objectant and his attorney have,
in such circumstances, a very serious and
difficult duty to appraise honestly doubts
having slight basis in fact, and not to allow
self interest to generate or amplify these
doubts unreasonably. Nor may the pursuit
or withdrawal of such objections be justly
used, directly or indirectly, as leverage for
a settlement in any amount in excess of
the probable cost of the examinations
which could be expected to satisfy the
tenuous doubts upon which the objections
are based.
Returning to the conclusion reached
upon the present facts, that the objectants
and their attorneys acted unjustly, it will
follow that the contestants and their at-
torneys are bound to make restitution for.
any harm done by their unjust conduct.
Provided they knew that their harassment
of the executor and the Orphanage was
unjust, and likely to cause labor and ex-
pense, they are morally bound to recom-
pense the work and the costs undertaken
by Green, Joiner, Farmer and the Orphan-
age Trustees in preparing to deal with these
baseless objections.
Each attorney cooperated formally in
his client's injustice, since he shared her
intent to unjustly harass Green and the
Trustees. Each cooperated affirmatively by
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advising and assisting his respective clients
to commence suit. A lawyer's co-operation
in each case is and will be actually ef-
fective as a concurring Zause of the entire
harm consequent upon the suit's com-
mencement and prosecution. Therefore,
each lawyer is bound severally with his
client for the entire amount of the conse-
quent damages. Sawyer may do his best
to persuade Gertrude to make good all of
the damages done by her objection, but if
she refuses, he must make good any dam-
age for which she does not pay. He will
then have the right to compensation from
her, in the amount by which his restitution
exceeds the fees she may have paid him.
Carpenter is in the same position in respect
of his client.1 9
If the women and their lawyers persist
in maintaining these objections, they will
become involved in further lies or perjuries
and, by continuing their unjust harassment,
will incur further obligations of restitution.
Such occasions may arise even before the
trial is commenced, for Gertrude may be
asked for a bill of particulars, specifying
when and by whom the fraud or duress she
alleges was exercised, and either woman
may be examined before trial.
Gertrude Gray has asked her attorney to
bargain the withdrawal of her objection for
the Orphanage Trustees' surrender to her
of some portion of their legacy. Carpenter
has made a similar proposal to his client,
namely, that she authorize him to ask the
Orphanage Trustees for some part of the
19 The doctrine controlling these conclusions on
restitution is treated fully in I AERTNYS-DAMEN,
THEOLOGIA MORALIS §§763-94, at 582-97 (15th
ed. 1947); cf. CONNELL, OUTLINES OF MORAL
THEOLOGY 116-19, 121-22 (1953); PRUIMMER,
HANDBOOK OF MORALTHEOLOGY §§302-13 (1957).
SOLUTION - "THE EVIL THAT MEN Do"
residue of the estate in exchange for the
withdrawal of her objection in the probate
proceeding. Both proposals are clearly im-
moral, because both contestants and their
attorneys well know that neither objection
is well-founded.
In the case of Gertrude the matter is
abundantly clear. When one, in exchange
for another's surrender of a value which at
least probably belongs to the other and to
which the offeror has no probable moral
claim, offers to surrender no value to
which the offeror is with any probability
entitled, the offeror is asking to receive
something for nothing. If he attempts to
put a color upon his offer by saying he will
remove an obstacle which he has placed
unjustly in the other's path, and which he
is already morally obliged to remove, he
places himself in the moral position of a
robber or a blackmailer. He does not,
when that obstacle is an unjust suit or the
threat of such a suit, change his moral posi-
tion by pointing to the "nuisance value" of
his suit. A claim without any probability
of right has no value whatever. The pro-
ceeds of any such settlement will have to
be restored and this duty will fall severally
upon attorney and client.
Molly Mauve's case is the same if she
is not entitled to the debt. But if she is thus
entitled, may she maintain her objection to
probate in order to coerce payment of what
is due to her? Even in that case, she acts
unjustly in maintaining her baseless objec-
tion, for she is harassing the executor and
the Orphanage Trustees in their possession
and exercise of their right to have the will
admitted although she is unable to show
probable cause why the will should not be
probated. She cannot, morally, use a lie to
put them to such trouble that they may be
persuaded to give her what is her due. Yet,
if she does so, she will then have no obli-
gation to repay to them anything they may
give her on account of her just debt. One
essential element of the duty to make
restitution of property whose surrender
was procured by unjust conduct is that
the person from whom it was taken had
a strict moral right to withhold it from the
person to whom he surrendered it. This is
not to say, of course, that Molly would
not be obliged to make restitution for any
damages caused by her conduct or of any
property she received in excess of her just
debt.
Moral Question 4: What is the moral qual-
ity of the purposes of Carpenter and his
client Molly Mauve, to bargain with the
Orphanage for the withdrawal of her
widow's claim, or to pursue that claim
on trial?
Molly Mauve's claim that she, as Black's
widow, is entitled to the entire estate of
Black if the will be refused probate, or to
half of the estate if the will be admitted,
is not a just one. At least after consulting
with her attorney, Molly well knows that
she did not become Black's common-law
wife, because the agreement in praesenti
required by the law of Connshire never
took place between them. In the face of
this knowledge, she and her attorney know
also that there is no probability she will
secure, by just means, the legal rights of a
widow.
A suitor does not present his claim
with its legal premises, or offer testimony,
in a vacuum. He says explicitly or implicitly
to the court that the testimony he offers
(Continued on page 174)
fact that we are apt to have more reliable
knowledge about classes than about indi-
viduals, the possibility of abuses of discre-
tion, and the practical difficulties of
administration are certainly factors to be
weighed in evaluating a penology of indi-
vidualization. 26
Undoubtedly debate will continue con-
cerning the methods that best approach
perfection in the treatment of habitual of-
26 Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law,
49 YALE L. J. 987, 1022 (1940).
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fenders. In the absence of the perfect
statute to apply, it but remains for the
courts to apply the imperfect as justly as
possible. The treatment of the Indiana Ha-
bitual Criminal Act by the Court in the
principal case is such an application in
view of the context in history of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, the purpose of which
was the declaration of newly enforced
freedoms, not the imposition of a subtle
and stultifying restriction of the penal
treatment of those who stand convicted of
criminal conduct.
SOLUTION OF
"THE EVIL THAT MEN DO"
(Continued)
entitles him, under the law, to the relief
he asks. In pleading and in argument the
court will be asked to conclude from the
testimony of Molly's Connshire neighbors
that she and Black contracted marriage by
mutual agreement. Though the testimony
will state facts objectively true and will be
veraciously offered by the witnesses, the
request that the court find this conclusion
implies that it is true, while in fact it is a
lie. If the conclusion is asserted or its find-
ing requested in verified pleadings, morally
there is perjury, though perhaps not from
the view of the criminal law.
The assertion and maintenance of this
claim before the court is an unjust harass-
ment of the executor and the Orphanage
Trustees, and will incur duties of restitu-
tion quite similar to those discussed in our
reply to the third question - in respect
both of consequential damages of the har-
assment and of any money or property
settlement extorted thereby.
Finally, the reader should note that this
problem case and the moral questions in-
volved have made no reference to the
Canon Law. If the Orphanage were an
institution of Catholic charity, rather than
a purely humane philanthropy as we have
here assumed, the Canons would impose
duties additional to those discussed in the
four answers above, but the conclusions
reached here would not be altered. Even
if the common-law marriage were invalid
because, for example, Molly or Black was
a Catholic who could not marry validly
except in a Catholic ceremony, her moral
rights as a successor in Black's property
would still be governed directly by the law
of the two states.
